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ERISA, PREEMPTION AND CALIFORNIA
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
Michael E. Caples*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Employee Retirement Income
and Security Act of 1974 (hereinafter ERISA)1 a conflict has
arisen as to whether pensions subject to ERISA regulation can
be divided as part of the community property by state courts
in marriage dissolution actions. A number of arguments have
been urged, involving federal preemption of the field and vari-
ous provisions contained in ERISA, which support subjecting
ERISA-regulated pension plans only to federal regulation and
not to division in a state dissolution proceeding. In His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo,' the Supreme Court discussed thor-
oughly the conflict between pension plans and nonemployee
spouses' and found that federal regulation preempted Califor-
nia community property law as it affected the division of pen-
sions received under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974.'
The purpose of this article is to examine the California
and federal cases dealing with the division of ERISA-regu-
lated pension plans, to evaluate the arguments supporting and
opposing federal preemption, and to draw some conclusions as
to the most appropriate resolutions of the various questions.
© 1982 by Michael E. Caples
* B.A., California State University, Fullerton; J.D., Whittier College School of
Law; LL.M., Labor Law, New York University; Associate with Pitney, Hardin, Kipp
& Szuch, Morristown, New Jersey.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
2. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
3. Typically, when the issue of federal preemption of community property law
is litigated, the community property division in a state trial court results in an order
that the pension plan pay directly to the nonemployee spouse a certain percentage of
the employee spouse's pension. See, e.g., Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust, 85 Cal.
App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978).
4. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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II. DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF CALIFORNIA
PROPERTY LAW
To properly discuss the pension plan issue, it is necessary
to examine the development and current status of California
community property5 law as it relates to pensions.
The leading case for many years dealing with the nature
of "retired pay" was, French v. French." In that case the wife
claimed that retired pay was community property because it
5. "Community property" is defined by the California statute as "property ac-
quired by husband and wife, or either, during marriage, when not acquired as the
separate property of either." CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (Deering 1971). See also CAL. CIv.
CODE § 5110 (Deering Supp. 1981) which reads: "[e]xcept as provided in Sections
5107, 5108, and 5109, all real property situated in this state and all personal property
wherever situated acquired during the marriage by a married person while domiciled
in this state ...is community property."
Together CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5107 & 5108 (Deering 1972) define separate property.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 5107 states: "All property of the wife, owned by her before marriage,
and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with the rents, is-
sues and profits thereof, is her separate property. The wife may, without the consent
of her husband, convey her separate property." CAL. Civ. CODE § 5108 states: "All
property owned by the husband before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by
gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with the rents, issues, and profits thereof, is his sepa-
rate property. The husband may, without the consent of his wife, convey his separate
property."
In addition to community property there are two additional classifications of
property which a California state court will divide as though they were community
property: "quasi-community property" and "quasi-marital property." CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 4803 (Deering 1972) defines quasi-community property as: "all real or personal
property, wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter acquired in any of the following
ways: a) By either spouse while domiciled elsewhere which would have been commu-
nity property if the spouse who acquired the property had been domiciled in this
state at the time of its acquisition."
Thus, pension rights acquired by an employee spouse while domiciled outside
California will be deemed by California courts to be quasi-community property to the
extent acquired during coverture.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4452 (Deering 1972) defines quasi-marital property thus:
Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable
and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good
faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such property
or parties to have the status of a putative spouse, and, if the division of
property is in issue, shall divide, in accordance with Section 4800, that
property acquired during the union which would have been community
property or quasi-community property if the union had not been void or
voidable. Such property shall be termed "quasi-marital property".
The actual division of community, quasi-community, or quasi-marital property is
governed by CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(a) (Deering Supp. 1981) which provides in rele-
vant part: "Except upon written agreement of the parties, or an oral stipulation of
the parties in open court, the court shall. . . divide the community property and the
quasi-community property of the parties . . . equally."
6. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
19821 ERISA
was compensation for services rendered during the existence
of the community. The California Supreme Court agreed, but
noted that the husband would not be eligible to receive the
pay until he completed fourteen years service in the naval re-
serve. The court concluded that "[alt the present time, his
right to retirement pay is an expectancy which is not subject
to division as community property."' 7 California courts fol-
lowed this rule until 1976, when it was overruled in In re Mar-
riage of Brown.8
The French decision dealt with nonvested pension rights
distinguishing two earlier decisions which concerned pensions
where the husbands already possessed certain or vested inter-
ests.' Courts maintained this vested-nonvested distinction
during the period between the French and Brown decisions.'0
7. Id. at 778, 112 P.2d at 237.
8. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
9. 17 Cal. 2d at 777, 112 P.2d at 236. See Dryden v. Board of Pension Comm'rs,
6 Cal. 2d 575, 59 P.2d 104 (1936); Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d 609
(1939). In Crossan, the husband had a vested right, his earnings deductions during
marriage. In Dryden the husband's right to a pension was held to be vested at the
time his employment began since the right was an integral part of the employment
contract under the city charter provisions.
10. See In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1974); Phillipson v. Board of Adm'n Pub. Emp. Retire. Sys., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473
P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970). In Fithian the California Supreme Court stated:
The law is settled in California that retirement benefits which flow from
the employment relationship, to the extent they have vested, are com-
munity property subject to equal division between the spouses in the
event the marriage is dissolved. [citation] Underlying the community
treatment of retirement benefits is the concept that they do not derive
from the beneficence of the employer, but are properly part of the con-
sideration earned by the employee.
10 Cal. 3d at 596, 517 P.2d at 451, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 371 (footnote omitted).
In a footnote which explained the meaning of "vested," the court explained:
The right to retirement benefits "vests" when an employee acquires an
irrevocable right in a fund created by his own contributions and/or the
contributions of his employer. The "vesting" of retirement benefits must
be distinguished from the "maturing" of those benefits, which occurs
only after the conditions precedent to the payment of the benefits have
taken place or are within the control of employee.
Id. n.2, 517 P.2d at 451 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 371 n.2. Similarly, the court in Phillip-
son noted:
Williamson v. Williamson (1962) 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 164, 167, summarized the law as follows: 'Pensions become com-
munity property, subject to division in a divorce, when and to the extent
that the party is certain to receive some payment or recovery of funds.
To the extent that payment is, at the time of the divorce, subject to
conditions which may or may not occur, the pension is an expectancy,
not subject to division as community property.' . . . [P]ension rights,
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Thus, where a pension could be characterized as vested it was
deemed community property subject to division by the court.
Where the rights to the pension were nonvested it was a mere
expectancy, not property, so not subject to division by the
court. I
In 1976, with the California Supreme Court decision of In
re Marriage of Brown, French was overruled and the cases re-
lying on it disapproved. 2 The Brown court said:
[Tihe French rule cannot stand because nonvested pen-
sion rights are not an expectancy but a contingent inter-
est in property; furthermore, the French rule compels an
inequitable division of rights acquired through commu-
nity effort. Pension rights, whether or not vested, re-
present a property interest; to the extent that such rights
derive from employment during coverture, they comprise
a community asset subject to division in a dissolution
proceeding."8
Thus, California case law now dictates that pensions, to
the extent they are earned by the employee spouse14 during
the existence of the community, 5 are to be apportioned as
having matured, were 'property' subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
3 Cal. 3d at 40-41, 473 P.2d at 770, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (footnotes omitted). The court
continued in a footnote:
While an employee continues in state employ, the nature and value
of his retirement pension is contingent both upon his survival until re-
tirement and his age at retirement. [citation] Thus the retirement bene-
fits of a present employee are classified as an expectancy, and neither
those rights nor their actuarial equivalent is divided or awarded as com-
munity property in a divorce proceeding. [citations] On the other hand,
no matter how or when an employee leaves state service he is entitled to
withdraw his accumulated contributions, unless he elects otherwise [ci-
tation]; if he dies in state employ the contributions or equivalent are
paid to his beneficiaries or estate [citation]. Thus the court should in-
clude the accumulated contributions in evaluating and dividing the com-
munity property [citation]; it cannot render any award, however, which
compels the board to pay over such contributions prior to the em-
ployee's termination of service with the state.
Id. n.8, 473 P.2d at 770 n.8, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 66 n.8.
11. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
12. 15 Cal. 3d at 841, 544 P.2d at 562, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
13. Id. at 841-42, 544 P.2d at 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
14. Where the masculine gender is used it is meant to include the feminine.
Since all the cases referred to deal with male employee spouses and female nonem-
ployee spouses, it is most convenient, and least confusing, to refer to the employee
spouse in the masculine.
15. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (Deering 1972), which reads: "The earnings and
accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of,
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community property. Consequently the community interest is
divided equally between the parties, with the remainder going
to the employee spouse as his or her separate property. This
procedure will be followed in all cases involving pensions un-
less there is some countervailing federal statute. 6
A. Pre-Hisquierdo Cases
The first California cases which dealt with the effect of
ERISA on the possible division of ERISA-regulated pensions
as community property in a state dissolution proceeding were
Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust17 and In re Marriage of
Johnston.'8 Both were issued before the Supreme Court de-
cided Hisquierdo.
Johns dealt summarily with the federal preemption issue
under ERISA, the issue of whether the spendthrift provisions
of ERISA' prevented the Pension Fund from making pay-
ments of one-half the amount of the pension to the former
spouse, and the issue of whether being required to mail a
check directly to the nonemployee spouse would be too bur-
densome on the Fund. The California Court of Appeal for the
Fourth District held (1) that "[i]n this day of computer tech-
nology, the burden of the Fund to make out two checks and
envelopes, rather than one, is insignificant,"20 (2) that "[t]he
the spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate
property of the spouse." Thus, the existence of a marriage does not mean there is a
community of the sort which creates community property rights. If the parties, even
though married, are living separate and apart from each other, earnings and accumu-
lations received during that period are the separate property of each. In this context,
"living separate and apart" means "that condition when spouses have come to a part-
ing of the ways with no present intention of resuming marital relations." Makeig v.
United Sec. Bank & Trust Co., 112 Cal. App. 138, 143, 296 P.2d 673, 675 (1931). See
also In re Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 448, 140 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781
(1977).
16. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (retirement benefits
under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 not subject to division as community
property by a state court); In re Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d 334, 167
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1980) (social security benefits not community property subject to divi-
sion in state court dissolution proceeding); In re Marriage of Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d
836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1980) (social security benefits).
17. 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
18. 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976) which provides: "Each pension plan shall pro-
vide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."
20. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 512, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
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spendthrift features of ERISA are not applicable because [the
wife] is an owner, not a creditor,"'" and (3) that "[ERISA]
does not preempt California law as applied here in matrimo-
nial matters.''22
The court in Johnston analyzed in detail the impact of
ERISA on California community property law. After acknowl-
edging that the pension benefits at issue were community
property under California law,23 the court, relying on Califor-
nia case law, concluded that "the broad preemptive language
of ERISA [did not] interfere with a state's right to control
distribution of marital property. 2 4 The California cases relied
upon, however, dealt with the Railroad Retirement Act of
1974,25 military disability pay,26 and state pension benefits.2
The Johnston court failed to analogize its case facts to those
cases which did not concern ERISA. In fact, the referred to
cases did not even analyze the statutes' purposes which cre-
ated the pension rights involved in each case.28 Thus, the pos-
sible similarity of underlying policies between ERISA and
those other statutory provisions dealing with pension benefits
could not form the basis of the Johnston court's conclusions.
Even if the court arguably purported to analyze the actual
language of the ERISA general preemption clause,29 it failed
21. Id. at 513, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 552. See also Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93
Misc. 2d 784, 401 N.Y.S. 2d 702 (1978).
22. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 513, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52.
23. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 905, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02.
24. Id. at 908, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
25. In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr.
590 (1977).
26. In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108
(1975), the United States Supreme Court recently held that military retirement pay is
not divisible as community property. McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981).
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, first noted "that military retired pay dif-
fers in some significant respects from a typical pension or retirement plan." Id. at
2735. Having noted the differences, however, he based the decision on the fact that
"the application of community property conflicts with the federal military retirement
scheme regardless of whether retired pay is defined as current or as deferred compen-
sation." Id. at 2736. Thus, the unique character of military retired pay renders it a
useless analogy in any analysis of ERISA preemption issues.
27. Phillipson v. Board of Adm'n Pub. Emp. Retire. Sys., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d
765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970).
28. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 907-08, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), reads in relevant part: "the provisions of . ..
this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereaf-
ter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title
[Vol. 22
ERISA
in its purpose. Nevertheless, the court concluded the ERISA
preemption clause did not preempt California community
property law."0
Relying on a number of federal district court cases, how-
ever, the court further supported its conclusion that there was
no federal preemption of California community property law.
Thus, citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes,3' the court noted
that where state law affects the administration or regulation
of a pension plan the law will be preempted. It reasoned that
ERISA was aimed at inconsistent state and local regulation of
employee benefit plans. Thus, orders which merely affected
the distribution of established benefits were not preempted.
The Johnston court also relied heavily upon the local na-
ture of domestic relations matters and the federal courts'
traditional reluctance to interfere with such matters. Citing In
re Marriage of Pardee,2 the court noted that if community
property laws are determined to be laws relating to employee
benefit plans, " 'the federal judiciary will have been granted a
roving commission to delineate family property law with little
assistance from the Congress as to how to proceed. Hopefully
Congress did not intend that the members of the federal judi-
ciary begin ad hoc to create a body of federal common law in
an area so traditionally the preserve of the states.' "8 They
also referred to Stone v. Stone8 which commented that "
'Congress does not infringe sub silentio "the power to make
rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life [which]
is committed by the Constitution of the United States. . . to
the Legislature of each state." ' ,,35
Finally the court in Johnston held that an order directing
payment of pension benefits by an employee benefit plan di-
rectly to a nonemployee ex-spouse did not violate the spend-
thrift provisions of ERISA.3 Such a community property dis-
tribution was neither an assignment nor an alienation, but
simply the honoring of an ownership right.87
30. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
31. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
32. 408 F. Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
33. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
34. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 3159 (1981).
35. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976). See note 19 supra.
37. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
1982]
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After Johns and Johnston, the California state courts'
position seemed fairly clear. The preemption clause of ERISA
did not preempt California community property law, nor did
Congress so occupy the field as to cause preemption. Neither
did orders directing covered plans to pay benefits directly to
nonemployee ex-spouses violate the antiassignment provisions
of ERISA. Unfortunately, though the courts' positions were
clear, and predictable, they did not reveal their reasoning.
B. The Hisquierdo Case
The United States Supreme Court, in 1979, decided His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo.38 There, Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, held that the 1974 Railroad Retirement Act s
preempted California community property law and forbade a
state court from dividing a pension governed by the Act as
community property.40
Initially the Court explained the standard for reviewing
state domestic relations law to determine if it was preempted.
Noting first that " '[t]he whole subject of . . . domestic rela-
tions. . . belongs to the laws of the States and not the laws of
the United States,' ,,"1 and that "[flederal courts repeatedly
have declined to assert jurisdiction over divorces that present
no federal question,""' the Court continued:
On the rare occasion when state family law has come into
conflict with a federal statute, this Court has limited re-
view under the Supremacy Clause to a determination
whether Congress has "positively required by direct en-
actment" that state law be preempted. [citation] A mere
conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and family-
38. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
39. 45 U.S.C. § 231-231t (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
40. 439 U.S. at 583-86. In Hisquierdo the wife argued two alternative means of
division. First, she argued that the trial court could retain jurisdiction over the pen-
sion payment and order the husband to pay her her share as he received the pay-
ments himself. As mentioned, this direct form of division was rejected by the Su-
preme Court. Id. Secondly, she contended that the trial court could, under In re
Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 927 (1975), award the entire pension to the husband while awarding
her offsetting community property then available, based on the acturial value of the
pension. Justice Blackmun also rejected this approach, saying "[a]n offsetting award
• . . would upset the statutory balance and impair petitioner's economic security just
as surely as would a regular deduction from this benefit check." 439 U.S. at 588.
41. 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting In re Burns, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1980)).
42. 439 U.S. at 581.
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property law must do "major damage" to "clear and sub-
stantial" federal interests before the Supremacy Clause
will demand that state law be overridden. United States
v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). 43
With this standard for guidance, the Court focused on the
purposes and policies underlying the Railroad Retirement
Act. The opening section of the opinion noted:
[The Railroad Retirement Act's] sponsors felt that the
Act would encourage older workers to retire by providing
them with the means "to enjoy the closing days of their
lives with peace of mind and physical comfort," and so
would "assure more rapid advancement in the service"
and also more jobs for younger workers. Both employees
and carriers pay a federal tax which funds a Railroad Re-
tirement Account."
The Court further noted the two-tiered nature of the Act's
benefits, one tier being similar to private pension funds while
the other tier was essentially a substitute for, and corre-
sponded exactly with, the provisions of the Social Security
Act.4 Thus, "[1]ike Social Security, and unlike most private
pension plans, railroad retirement benefits are not contrac-
tual. Congress may alter, and even eliminate, them at any
time." Moreover, detailed provisions of the Act provided for
a worker's spouse, but the benefits terminated when the
spouse and worker were absolutely divorced.47 Finally, in ac-
cordance with Congress' plenary power over railroad retire-
ment benefits, it amended the Act's antiassignment provi-
sions, specifically allowing such benefits to be attached to
satisfy child support or alimony obligations.' 8 The definition
of alimony expressly excluded community property division.4 e
With the above provisions in mind the Court properly
43. Id. See also 450 F. Supp. at 924-25.
44. 439 U.S. at 573-74.
45. Id. at 574-75. California has held, in cases citing Hisquierdo, that social se-
curity benefits are not subject to division as community property. In re Marriage of
Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d 334, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1980); In re Marriage of Cohen,
105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1980); In re Marriage of Nizenkoff, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 136, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1976); In re Marriage of Kelly, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82,
134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1976). Accord, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
46. 439 U.S. at 575.
47. Id. See also 45 U.S.C. § 231d(c)(3) (1976).
48. 439 U.S. at 575. See also 45 U.S.C. § 231a(c)(3)(i) (1976).
49. 439 U.S. at 575-76 nn.8 & 9.
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concluded that state community property law was preempted.
Since the Act was intended to guarantee that the benefits
would reach and remain with the retiree50 so as to encourage
retirement from service, a division of the benefits as commu-
nity property would frustrate its purpose by discouraging the
employee-spouse from retiring,61 and actually working as a
positive incentive to keep the employee-spouse working. 2 The
conclusion was strongly supported by the Congressional ac-
tions in providing for spousal and child support while explic-
itly terminating spousal rights to benefits upon absolute di-
vorce and expressly excluding community property
settlements from the term "alimony."
C. Post- Hisquierdo Cases
California courts have in four opportunities since the His-
quierdo decision reviewed claims of federal preemption by
ERISA.
In re Marriage of Campa" was a case the California
Court of Appeal decided prior to publication of the His-
quierdo decision. However, on rehearing after the Hisquierdo
decision, the court affirmed its earlier decision,"' relying pri-
marily on footnote twenty-four of Hisquierdo, where Justice
Blackmun said the decision did not apply to ERISA-regulated
pensions."5
The Campa court, after noting the "manifest purpose" to
preempt standard under which it would analyze the case,
looked to the purpose of ERISA. The court summarized the
legislative history of the Act relating to the sharp need for
pension reform, which was the motivation for the Act's pas-
sage, and further reviewed the major reforms which were
50. Id. at 584.
51. This conclusion follows from the fact that the employee-spouse would have
less income on which to retire.
52. This conclusion follows from the fact that any income attributable to the
employee-spouse's efforts after separation constitutes part of his separate property.
See CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 5107, 5101 & 5118 (Deering 1972) quoted in notes 5 & 14
supra.
53. 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
1028 (1980). Campa was a consolidation of three cases: In re Marriage of Campa, In
re Marriage of Durkin, and Bryant v. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund.
54. Id. at 132, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
55. 439 U.S. at 590 n.24.
[Vol. 22
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mandated by the Act." The court concluded that ERISA's
purpose was to assure "that pension rights are real-that new
employees are not kept from participating in a plan for a long
time and that expected benefits do not evaporate due to un-
derfunding, maladministration, a company going out of busi-
ness or a termination of employment after many years of
work. '57 With this background, the court examined the
ERISA preemption claim.
A summary of the California law regarding division of
community property and the characterization of pension ben-
efits led to the conclusion that the California law which alleg-
edly conflicted with ERISA was "concerned with effectuating
a fair division of the monthly pension check between the for-
mer spouses."" The court concluded:
This concern plainly has no bearing on the effort of Con-
gress ... to assure genuine pension rights. To ask a pen-
sion plan to send two monthly checks instead of one does
not interfere with any of the Congressional objectives. It
is, in fact, consonant with the objective of assuring that
the members of the family receive the pension which they
anticipated. We cannot find in ERISA or its extensive
legislative history an unmistakable ordaining or "clear
and manifest purpose" to prevent states from achieving
this simple and sensible aim in their domestic relations
proceedings."
The court felt this conclusion was reinforced by the fact that
domestic relations is a particularly local concern.60
Further, the court believed that the ERISA antiassign-
ment and alienation provisions did not affect the division of
benefit payments as community property. Again, Congress'
concern was to keep retirement benefits intact until the em-
ployee reaches retirement age. Division of benefits, once re-
ceived, did not clash with this objective. Rather, "[iut merely
assures that the ex-wife partakes of the pension to the extent
that it was earned as a result of the community effort. [cita-
tion] Her rights are those of an owner, not a creditor.
56. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 120-23, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 365-67.
57. Id. at 123, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
58. Id. at 124, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
59. Id.
60. Id.
1982]
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[citation]"'
In re Marriage of Bastian6 2 does not add to the analysis
of the preemption issue. Relying to some extent, as did the
Campa court, on the pre-Hisquierdo cases of Jones and John-
ston and addressing specifically the burden on pension plans
following a division of pension benefits, the court noted sum-
marily that the burden on plans of having to mail out two
checks rather than one was insignificant. It was apparently on
the basis of such an alleged burden that the plan claimed an
improper interference with the purposes of ERISA. 3 The
court never really reached the issue, since the trial court had
not yet determined a distribution method, 64 and it was possi-
ble that the trial court could formulate a remedy the plan
61. Id. at 125, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 368. The appellant-fund in Campa further
claimed: (1) That Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978), supported a finding of
preemption. This claim was rejected as the state law in Barnes was an attempt at
actually regulating pension plans, thus conflicting with ERISA. (2) That preemption
is indicated by the fact that certain tax sections of ERISA were to apply without
regard to community property law. The court noted that "Ithe fact that Congress
chose to supersede community property laws selectively gives rise to a strong infer-
ence that Congress did not intend to preempt them generally. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 126,
152 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (emphasis in original). (3) That provisions of collective bargain-
ing agreements negotiated under the aegis of the National Labor Relations Act gener-
ally supersede conflicting state law (the plan here prohibited nonemployee spouses
from obtaining any order or other process against the fund). Relying on Malone v.
White Motor Co., 435 U.S. 497 (1978), the court rejected this claim. "There is nothing
in the NLRA ...which expressly forecloses all state regulatory power with respect
to those issues, such as pension plans, that may be the subject of collective bargain-
ing." Id. at 504. (4) That the fiduciary obligations sections of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a) (1976), requiring in essence that fiduciaries discharge their duties exclusively
for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries and within certain limits, forbade a
plan from honoring state court orders requiring benefit payments to divorced spouses.
Again, the contention was rejected. The court noted that Congress' concern was with
the course of conduct of plans and the accountability of fiduciaries. The division of
pension benefits, once they are already being paid out, had no bearing on the skillful
and honest administration of the plan. (5) That community property laws "relate to"
pension plans within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) insofar as they govern
joinder of plans. But the court noted that these sections actually provide added pro-
tection for, and evidence added concern for, pension plans. Thus, the possibility of
conflict with Congress' concerns was lessened. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 126-31, 152 Cal.
Rptr. at 369-72.
62. 94 Cal. App. 3d 483, 156 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979).
63. Just what purposes were allegedly interfered with is never made clear.
64. It was possible that offsetting assets would be awarded, consistent with In
re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), see note 39 supra, or the husband could be ordered to
pay the wife her share after he received his check each month.
ERISA
would find acceptable. 5
The third case, In re Marriage of Pilatti,66 also alleged
lack of jurisdiction in state courts as well as federal preemp-
tion through ERISA. Noting the peculiarly local nature of do-
mestic relations matters, and the fact that the plan's interpre-
tation of ERISA would require removal to federal court of any
case even remotely involving a pension plan, the court re-
jected the jurisdictional argument. Since the preemption issue
was tied to the jurisdictional argument, it too was rejected,67
but with no analysis, simply a citation to Johns v. Retirement
Fund Trust."
The court also rejected the standard antialienation and
assignment clause argument, saying the wife was an owner of
the benefit rights. Thus, she was not a creditor, but was a par-
ticipant in the pension by operation of law. The court relied
on California case law interpreting similar provisions in state
statutes to support its conclusion. Thus, the analysis was not
particularly illuminating. Indeed, in view of different Congres-
sional concerns in enacting national regulatory legislation, the
authorities relied upon by the court may have been inapposite
to the issue of whether division as community property would
constitute an assignment or alienation within the meaning of
the federal statute. The fact that state law might consider a
spouse an "owner" of pension rights otherwise payable to the
employee-spouse would be irrelevant if the state policy and
interpretation conflicted with the federal policy. In that event,
the nonemployee spouse, regardless of characterization, would
have no rights to the pension benefits. Hisquierdo, which the
Pilatti court so readily distinguished, is a perfect example of
this conflict.
It was not until the court dealt with the Hisquierdo deci-
65. The rest of the Bastian decision was concerned with whether the trial court
had in personam jurisdiction over the plan and with forum non conveniens. Relying
on the minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), and in particular on the analogous cases of Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia
ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) and McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the court found sufficient minimum contact to warrant in
personam jurisdiction. The forum non conveniens argument failed in a balancing of
the facts.
66. 96 Cal. App. 3d 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916
(1980).
67. Id. at 65-66, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
68. 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
1028 (1980). Unfortunately, Johns lacks analysis, so the citation is not very helpful.
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sion, which it distinguished almost offhand, that it made even
a passing reference to the policy underlying ERISA. Unfortu-
nately, the reference was not helpful in analyzing the preemp-
tion issue. Indeed, the real reliance in distinguishing His-
quierdo seemed to be on footnote twenty-four of that
opinion."9
The last California case dealing with the issue of ERISA
as it relates to community property law, is In re Marriage of
Mantor.7 Again, the case provided little analysis regarding
this issue. Citing Johns, Johnston, and Campa, the court dis-
posed almost summarily of the issues of state court jurisdic-
tion to order disbursement to a nonemployee spouse, ERISA
preemption of community property law insofar as it gives an
interest in a pension to a nonemployee spouse, and the state
court's power to order benefit payments directly to a nonem-
ployee spouse. The court ruled that the trial court did have
jurisdiction and power to award the nonemployee spouse an
interest in the benefits and to order direct payment from the
plan. 71
D. California Courts' Present View
Clearly, the California courts believe that ERISA does
not preempt California community property law concerning
ERISA-regulated pension plans, do not believe that California
courts do have jurisdiction and power to order direct pay-
ments to a nonemployee spouse of her community property
share of the benefits, and that such awards are neither assign-
ments nor alienations within the meaning of the antiassign-
ment and alienation provisions of ERISA. The Hisquierdo de-
cision has not changed this position.
69. See text accompanying note 55 supra. While the court did not rely improp-
erly on footnote 24 of Hisquierdo, it nevertheless managed to avoid facing the issues
discussed in Hisquierdo. Justice Blackmun did not state that the analysis in His-
quierdo was inapplicable to ERISA-regulated pensions. He stated only that His-
quierdo itself expressed no view, one way or the other. This was proper since the
preemption and ERISA issues were not before the Court. Thus, the question of the
applicability of the reasoning in Hisquierdo to ERISA-regulated pensions was still an
open question and should have been discussed rather than summarily dismissed.
70. 104 Cal. App. 3d 981, 164 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1980).
71. Id. at 985-86, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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III. THE FEDERAL CASE LAW
The first two federal cases Which dealt with the interac-
tion of California community property law and ERISA were
Stone v. Stone7 ' and Francis v. United Technologies Corp.73
Each federal district court case involved a nonemployee
spouse who sued a pension plan to enforce her community
property interest in the plan benefits; and each was decided
before the Supreme Court decision in Hisquierdo.
In a well-reasoned and thorough decision, the Stone court
held that California community poperty law did not conflict
with section 206(d)(1) 7  of ERISA, forbidding assignments
and alienations. 5 Nor were state community property laws
preempted by ERISA through section 514(a),71 which provides
that state laws "relating to" ERISA-regulated pensions are
superseded by ERISA 7
The court first noted that "[a] conflict between state and
federal statutes exists 'where the state "law stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress." [citations].' -7 Thus, the
court was forced to examine the purposes of, and policies un-
derlying, ERISA. Against the background of the strong federal
72. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 3158 (1981).
73. 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976). That section provides in relevant part:
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall
not be taken into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of
not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment, or of any irrevocable
assignment or alienation of benefits executed before September 2, 1974.
The preceeding sentence shall not apply to any assignment or alienation
made for the purpose of defraying plan administration costs.
75. 450 F. Supp. at 931.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). That section provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions
of this subchapter [subchapter I concerning reporting and disclosure,
participation and vesting, funding, fiduciary responsibilities, administra-
tion and enforcement] and subchapter III [concerning plan termination
insurance] of this chapter shall supercede any and all state laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan de-
scribed in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title.
77. 450 F. Supp. at 933.
78. Id. at 924 (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
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policy of non-interference with state domestic relations laws,7 '
the court considered the terms of section 206(d)(1) and their
possible conflict with state l'aw. The court noted that
[tihe possibility of a conflict between California commu-
nity property law and 206(d)(1) . . . cannot be avoided
by categorizing a community property interest as an own-
ership rather than a creditor interest .... This mode of
analysis focuses on whether the nonemployee spouse's
claim is an ownership or creditor interest, but the charac-
terization of the interest under state property law does
not affect the degree of conflict with the purposes of the
federal statute, which determines whether state law is
preempted.80
This cogent and accurate statement of the law was the
point California courts missed. Those courts used state law
concepts, which in and of themselves conflicted with ERISA,
to characterize state-created property rights in federally regu-
lated benefit plans in such a way as to find no conflict with
ERISA. The reasoning was circular and led to an anomalous
result.
In examining 206(d)(1)'s terms, the court noted that they
did not expressly preclude division as community property,
and that the plain import of the terms "assignment" or
"alienation" would not include divisions as community prop-
erty." Since there was no conflict with the express terms of
the statute, the next step was to
rely primarily on an analysis of policy considerations in
interpreting §206(d)(1) .... More specifically, the Court
must compare the interest in benefits which the nonem-
79. Id. at 924-25. The court said at one point that "Congress does not infringe
sub silentio 'the power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life
[which] is committed by the Constitution of the United States . . . to the legislature
of [each state].' " (emphasis in original) Id. at 924 (quoting Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
80. Id. at 925. The court continued:
If the characterization under state property law were dispositive, a
spouse entitled to a fair and equitable share of marital property in a
non-community property state . . . could not collect benefits if the law
of that state did not recognize a pre-existing ownership interest as Cali-
fornia law does. The substance of the spousal claim to marital property
conflicts no more or no less with § 206(d)(1) because of the forum in
which it is asserted.
Id. at 925-26.
81. Id. at 926.
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ployee spouse has under the community property laws
with the interest in benefits asserted by other claimants.
If Congress could have had no discernible reason to treat
those kinds of interests differently, its clear intent to pro-
hibit the transfer of one kind of interest demonstrates its
intent to prohibit the transfer of the other kind. If, on the
other hand, the relative interests of husband and wife dif-
fer from the relative interests of participant and other
claimants, no basis to infer a clear congressional intent to
preempt community property laws exists."3
This analysis lead to the conclusion that there was no
conflict between the community property claims of a spouse
and the purposes of section 206(d)(1). Families are among the
class of people ERISA was designed to protect. The basic pur-
pose of ERISA is to protect those who must rely on benefits
from private pension plans in their retirement."3
Congress was concerned not only about the workers them-
selves whose employment entitles them to benefits. Con-
gress was also concerned about the families of those work-
ers who depend to the same degree on the actual
availability of those benefits. It would be ironic indeed if
a provision designed in part to insure that an employee
spouse would be able to meet his obligations to family af-
ter retirement were interpreted to permit him to evade
them with impunity after divorce."
82. Id.
83. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4640-41; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4839-40.
84. 450 F. Supp. at 926. See also Operating Eng'rs' Local No. 428 Pension Trust
Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981) (ERISA does not preclude state
court from ordering garnishment of pension benefits of an individual who falls behind
in monthly maintenance payments to an ex-spouse). The court bolstered its conclu-
sion by noting the ramifications of denying a nonemployee spouse a community prop-
erty share of pension benefits. One argument stated that by insulating a substantial
community asset from community property claims in the event of divorce might lead
a nonemployee spouse to anticipate (or perhaps precipitate) the divorce by limiting
her contributions to the marriage. 450 F. Supp. at 926. This, however, seems too spec-
ulative in creating a make-weight argument.
Furthermore, even though ERISA-regulated benefits could be reached for
spousal support awards, this did not alter the conclusion, since such awards may not
be limited to essential needs, but may be ordered in sufficient amount to support the
ex-spouse in the manner in which she lived before the divorce. Thus, not much differ-
ence may exist between the two. Id. at 927.
Nor did the possibility of an increased burden on benefit plans impress the court.
The court noted that § 206(d)(1) did not protect any interests of plans as plans. Id. at
ERISA19821
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In discussing the possibility of preemption of state law by
section 514(a), forbidding state laws relating to ERISA-regu-
lated plans, the court stated that, though the section was in-
tended to have broad preemptive effect, it "was not ...
designed to preempt any state law with even the most tangen-
tial relation to ERISA." 85 The court noted that section
206(d)(1) covered prohibitions on transfers, since it previously
found that the specific section did not prohibit division as
community property, the court refused to find that the more
general provisions of section 514(a) prohibited the division.e
The second case dealing with ERISA and California com-
munity property law, Francis, was decided, as was Stone, by
the District Court for the Northern District of California. The
judge in Francis, however, in a less thorough decision than
Stone, disagreed with his brother judge. In reaching his deci-
sion he relied on another case, Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes . 7
The Hewlett-Packard opinion was written by the same judge
who wrote the Stone opinion, even though the Stone court did
not mention that case. In Francis, the court, quoting from
section 514(a) of ERISA, and relying on Hewlett-Packard,
cursorily concluded that ERISA totally preempted pensions
930.
Finally, in a footnote, the court mentioned the fact that the California case of In
re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), might allow a court to compensate a nonemployee spouse
by awarding that person offsetting community property in an amount equal to one-
half the community interest in the pension benefits, even though ERISA might other-
wise prohibit division of the benefits themselves. 450 F. Supp. at 927 n.12. If ERISA
involves as complete a preemption of state law as some would claim, see Francis v.
United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) and note 86 and
accompanying text infra, and in light of the subsequent Hisquierdo decision, 439 U.S.
at 588, it would foreclose this possibility.
85. 450 F. Supp. at 932.
86. Id. The court also stated, in a footnote, that
ERISA does not preempt state community property laws to the ex-
tent they authorize the transfer to the nonemployee spouse of her
spouse's federal cause of action under § 502(a)(1)(B) as well as the
transfer of the right to the benefits themselves. If ERISA permits the
transfer of the latter it permits the transfer of the former. If Congress
intended to permit divorced non-employee spouses to receive their com-
munity interest in benefits directly from employee benefit plans, it is
reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to give them the means
to obtain the benefits which belong to them.
Id. at 933 n.17.
87. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afJ'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
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88and other employee benefit programs.
The court further held that section 206(d)(1) precluded
division of pension benefits, since such a division would con-
stitute an alienation of one half the benefits.89 Again, however,
the court concluded without analyzing why such a result
should obtain, particularly in view of the strong federal policy
of noninterference in state domestic relations matters.90
Finally, the Francis court held that no court had jurisdic-
tion to hear a claim by a nonemployee ex-spouse to ERISA-
regulated pension benefits. This conclusion followed because
section 502(a)(1)(B)91 of ERISA allows only participants and
beneficiaries a cause of action to recover benefits due. Like-
wise, section 502(a)(3), 92 providing for other equitable relief,
88. 458 F. Supp. at 86 (quoting Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F.
Supp. 382, 387 (D. Kan. 1977)).
89. Id.
90. The Francis court noted the Stone decision but disagreed with it. Id. First,
the Francis judge summarized the Stone holding as stating that, though the nonem-
ployee spouse has no independent cause of action against a retirement plan, and §
1056(d)(1) forbids assignment and alienation of plan benefits, the employee spouse's
cause of action is not prohibited and can therefore be involuntarily assigned to the
nonemployee spouse by operation of California community property law. This, how-
ever, was not the holding in Stone. The Stone holding was that the benefits them-
selves were transferable, not constituting an alienation or assignment in the first in-
stance. 450 F. Supp. at 926. All the Stone court said about transfer of causes of action
was that if the benefits could be transferred, logically the means to collect could also
be transferred. Id. at 933 n.17. See note 86 supra.
Second, the Francis court stated that a total preemption of California commu-
nity property law was not novel. In support he cited the United States Supreme
Court decision in Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), as being an analogous
situation. There, the Court "held that California's community property laws are pre-
empted by the broad national statutory scheme of the National Service Life Insur-
ance Act which allowed the insured to designate the beneficiary of all of the policy's
benefits, thus defeating a spouse's community property interest in the policy." 458 F.
Supp. at 86.
But the court's analysis fails for two reasons. First, Wissner was inapposite. That
case involved a direct clash of conflicting state and federal statutes. The federal stat-
ute affirmatively gave absolute freedom of choice to a serviceman in the selection of
his beneficiary. Division of benefits under California community property law directly
contravene the federally created right. No such situation arguably exists where the
federal law focuses on the administration of a trust, does not create any affirmative
right of exclusivity in the employee spouse, and merely ensures that pension benefits
will still exist at retirement so that the employee .will be able to provide for his fam-
ily. Thus, Wissner provides a dubious analogy.
Second, it appears the Francis court was myopic being unable, or unwilling, to
analyze beyond the black-and-white terms of ERISA and view it in light of its and
other federal policies which might have affected its enforcement.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1976).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1976).
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grants causes of action only to participants, beneficiaries, and
fiduciaries. The court felt that the only category a nonem-
ployee ex-spouse could arguably fit into was that of a benefi-
ciary,93 and here the ex-spouse had not been so designated by
her former husband. 4
Clearly, a serious split of opinion existed in the Northern
District of California as to the interaction of ERISA and Cali-
fornia community property law. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals resolved this conflict when it took two cases on ap-
peal: Stone v. Stone" and Carpenters Pension Trust v.
Kronschnabel.'
In Kronschnabel the pension plan conceded that ERISA
did not prevent California courts from treating ERISA-regu-
lated pension rights as community property. The only ques-
tion the court studied was "whether a state court may require
the trustees of an ERISA-regulated pension plan to pay some
portion of pension payments directly to a participant's ex-
spouse." ' The court of appeals found the United States Su-
preme Court's dismissal of the appeal in In re Marriage of
Campa98 for want of a substantial federal question dispositive,
and affirmed the state court's power to issue such orders."
The court first stated that "[a] summary dismissal by the
Supreme Court of an appeal from a state court for want of a
substantial federal question, when the federal question is
properly presented and within the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction . . . operates as a decision on the merits." 100
Quoting from Mandel v. Bradley,0 1 the court continued:
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a sub-
stantial federal question without doubt reject the specific
challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction and
do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They
do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclu-
93. But see Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1980), where there is
some indication that a nonemployee ex-spouse may indeed fit within the meaning of
"participant."
94: 458 F. Supp. at 87.
95. 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3158 (1981).
96. 632 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3159 (1981).
97. Id. at 747.
98. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
99. 632 F.2d at 747.
100. Id.
101. 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
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sions on the presise issues presented and necessarily de-
cided by those actions. . . . Summary actions, ...
should not be understood as breaking new ground but as
applying principles established by prior decisions to the
particular facts involved."0 2
An examination of the jurisdictional statement in
Campa0 s revealed that in dismissing the appeal, "the Su-
preme Court necessarily considered and rejected the argument
that ERISA preempts a state court order requiring the trust-
ees of a pension plan to divide pension payments between the
employee and his or her ex-spouse."'O4
The court reached the same conclusion in Stone10 5 relying
on Kranschnabel. Since the court disposed of the preemption
question, the only issue remaining was "whether the district
court properly exercised jurisdiction to reach the merits in
this case."106 The answer to that question turned on "whether
the district court would have had jurisdiction over this action
had it been filed originally in district court.
10 7
In Kerbow v. Kerbow0 8 a federal district court held that
a nonemployee ex-spouse lacks standing to sue under section
502(a)(1)(B). It further held that ERISA was generally pre-
emptive, so ex-spouses who had no standing under section
502(a)(1)(B) may not bring a civil action in any court against
an ERISA-regulated plan to enforce community property
rights against the plan. 109
102. 632 F.2d at 747.
103. Id. at 748. The jurisdictional statement was:
1. Do the provisions of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act, commonly known as ERISA, supercede the provisions of the
California community property law and implementing statutes and
court rules insofar as they relate to an employee benefit plan covered by
the Act?
2. Does a state court have jurisdiction to order the board of trustees of
an employee pension plan covered by ERISA to make benefit payments
in violation of the provisions of the documents and instruments gov-
erning the plan?
Id.
104. Id.
105. 632 F.2d at 742.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
109. Id. at 1259-60. The Kerbow court noted that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(s)(1) (1976)
of ERISA was the sort of jurisdictional grant which is "hopelessly intertwined with
questions of standing and failure to state a claim." Id. at 1259. Thus, the court first
ERISA1982]
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Again, however, the circuit court found that the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the Campa appeal directly concerned the
issues of the jurisdiction of state courts to order direct pay-
ments by pension plans to nonemployee ex-spouses and fed-
eral preemption of state community property laws. 110 Since
the state court found no preemption, and did find jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court's dismissal "necessarily determined that
ERISA, including section 502(a)(1)(B), does not foreclose
suits in state courts against ERISA-regulated pension plans
by spouses seeking to enforce community property inter-
ests. . . .Hence, Kerbow was decided incorrectly." '
Clearly, then, the Ninth Circuit interprets ERISA as not
preempting California community property law, nor divesting
state courts of jurisdiction to order direct payments by pen-
sion funds to nonemployee ex-spouses.
IV. VIABILITY OF THE ERISA PREEMPTION ARGUMENTS
The foregoing summary and case analysis indicates that
arguments that ERISA prevents state courts from requiring
direct payment to nonemployee ex-spouses involve three main
issues: (1) that ERISA is a comprehensive piece of legislation
which occupies the field of pension regulations; (2) that sec-
tion 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA," 2 which determines the jurisdic-
tion of courts in cases against pension funds, does not grant
standing to sue nonemployee ex-spouses; (3) that section
206(d)(1),'"I forbidding assignments and alienations, prevents
state courts from ordering direct payments to nonemployee
ex-spouses.
inquired into the standing of an exspouse, under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1976), to
bring the action. That section says civil actions may be brought by participants or
beneficiaries, and the court noted that it was undisputed that the ex-spouse was not
within the Act's meaning. In light of that conclusion, the district court dismissed the
claims of the ex-spouses and remanded to the state court. Id. at 1260. However, the
decision was reached with very little analysis, beyond the four corners of the Act, of
the policies underlying ERISA, and with no consideration of, or attempt to reconcile,
important state community property concerns. See also Francis v. United Technolo-
gies Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 86-87.
110. See note 103 supra.
111. 632 F.2d at 743.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1976).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
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A. Preemption
There are two bases to the argument that ERISA is a
comprehensive piece of legislation which occupies the field of
pension regulation. The first, a statutory basis, relies on
ERISA's section 514(a)11 which expressly supersedes any and
all state laws "relating to" ERISA-regulated pension plans.
The second, the general preemption argument, is that ERISA
is such a complete scheme of regulation that it deprives states
generally from acting in the area.
Turning to the latter basis first, the argument cannot
stand. Although ERISA apparently occupies the pension regu-
lation field," 5 this does not mean that every state law with
even a tangential effect on pension plans is proscribed." ' Un-
less there is some interference with the federal legislation's
purposes or goals, no conflict between it and state laws which
tangentially impact the federal scheme should be found. 117
This particularly relates to the important local state interest
in domestic relations which otherwise would be preempted. '18
The Congressional concerns in enacting ERISA are evi-
dent in ERISA's provisions. The seven major reforms in
ERISA are: (1) setting a maximum length of time an em-
ployee must work to become a participant in a pension plan;
(2) setting "minimum vesting standards, giving employees
nonforfeitable rights to a pension upon reaching retirement
age, whether or not they leave their employment before that
age;"11 9 (3) setting up minimum funding requirements to keep
plans solvent; (4) setting up an insurance system (the Pension
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
115. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal.
1977). In Agsalud, Hawaii's state health insurance law was held to be preempted by
ERISA. The state law contained specific requirements for coverage by the plans as
well as certain reporting requirements which differed from those of ERISA. Id. at
696.
116. See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 932.
117. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). The Supreme Court said
in Ray that conflict exists "where the state 'law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
118. See Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968), where the court said
"'the whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, be-
longs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the United States.'" (quoting
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930)) Id. at 372.
119. See In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 122, 152 Cal. Rptr. at
366-67.
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Benefit Guaranty Corporation) to ensure receipt of pension
benefits by vested employees even in the event of premature
plan termination; (5) setting up fiduciary standards and re-
porting and disclosure requirements; (6) providing for "ad-
ministrative and judicial remedies; 12 0 (7) making certain tax
changes." These reforms are intended to ensure that pension
benefits, toward which employees work over a period of years,
are obtainable when the employee retires.1 2 One of the rea-
sons this assurance is needed is to make sure retired employ-
ees will continue to be able to provide for their families. '
No conflict, real or potential, exists between the concerns
noted above and orders of state courts requiring pension plans
to make direct payments to nonemployee ex-spouses. Neither
the letter nor the aim of any of those provisions is interfered
with. In fact, the state court orders further the concern for the
retired employee's family.
The Railroad Retirement Act's provisions support this
conclusion. The provisions were largely responsible for the Su-
preme Court's preemption decision in Hisquierdo. Section
231(d)(e)(3)' 24 of the Railroad Retirement Act provides that
in the event of absolute divorce the entitlement of a spouse to
an annuity will terminate. This provision addressed the policy
of that Act, which was to encourage railroad employees to re-
tire. ERISA does not involve such a policy; and though Con-
gress clearly knows how to deal with the situation of divorced
employees, as it expressly did in the Railroad Retirement Act,
it chose not to use that limitation in ERISA. Thus, ERISA
does not preclude provision of benefits to nonemployee former
spouses. 12
120. Id. at 122, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 121-22, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 366. See also [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5177 (statement of Harrison A. Williams, Chairman of the Senate Commit-
tee on Labor and Public Welfare).
123. 450 F. Supp. at 926.
124. 45 U.S.C. § 231d(c)(3) (1976).
125. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976), Social Security Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647,
§ 101(a), 88 Stat. 2357 (1976), which amended section 231m of the Railroad Retire-
ment Act and similar provisions in all other federal benefit plans relating to non-
assignability of benefits, allows the benefits to be reached to satisfy spousal and child
support obligations. Section 459 was later clarified by section 462(c) (Pub. L. No. 95-
30, § 501(d), 91 Stat. 160 (1977)) which made clear that community property settle-
ments were not included in the exemption to section 231m. Thus, it could be argued
that absent an expression to the contrary, non-assignability clauses should include
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The statutory basis for a preemption finding is section
514(a) of ERISA and the effect of state court orders directing
payments by regulated plans to nonemployee ex-spouses. As
previously mentioned, that section supersedes any and all
state laws relating to regulated pension plans. The argument
for preemption says a state court order requiring a plan to
make payments directly to an ex-spouse "relates to" the plan.
This argument, though superficially logical, neglects ERISA's
underlying policies and fails to accommodate important state
concerns. Nor can the meaning of "relates to" be said to be so
unambiguous as to preclude interpretation. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court rejected recently the "plain meaning" rule,' 2
even if it would otherwise be applicable here.
The ERISA policies and the state concerns in domestic
relations matters were discussed above. Due to the important
and uniquely local state concerns with domestic relations, no
interference with congressional objectives results, and the
clearly tangential relationship of direct-payment orders to
ERISA-regulated plans does not "relate to" regulated pension
plans within the meaning of section 514(a).
Therefore, ERISA does not preempt California commu-
nity property law, either by the general preemption doctrine
or by section 514(a) of ERISA.127
community property divisions. However, these clauses must in the first instance be
viewed in light of the purposes for and policies underlying the federal benefit plans to
which they apply, such as the Railroad Retirement Act. See Train v. Colorado Pub.
Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976), for the proper approach to statutory con-
struction to be used in examining the antiassignment provisions of ERISA. See note
126 infra.
126. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976). The
Court in Train held that courts can and should consider legislative history even if the
language of the statute is clear. Id. at 9-10. As summarized in Standard Oil Co. of
Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), "[tlhe rule of statutory construc-
tion established in CPIRG is that unambiguous evidence in the structure and history
of the legislation can rebut a contrary presumption created by unambiguous language
of the legislation. Courts cannot amend statutes in the guise of interpreting them,
and they must presume that Congress meant what it said. But the presumption,
though heavy, is rebuttable." Id. at 703.
127. Indeed, because pension plans commonly do not object to the distribution
of benefits to nonemployee ex-spouses, they arguably concede that no preemption
exists, at least under the general doctrine. See, e.g., Carpenters Pension Trust v.
Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d at 747. This follows from the language of Mr. Justice Black-
mun in Hisquierdo, indicating that such post-receipt distribution of an award of
other community property to make up for the community share of the pension lost by
the nonemployee ex-spouse would be contrary to the purposes of the Railroad Retire-
ment Act and so forbidden by preemption. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 588.
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B. Standing of Nonemployee Ex-spouses Pursuant to Sec-
tion 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA
Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA provides:
(a) A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
(B) to recover benefits due to him under
the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan.
"Participant" is defined as
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any
member or former member of an employee organization,
who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any
type from an employee benefit plan which covers employ-
ees of such employer of members of such organization, or
whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such
benefits.126
"Beneficiary" means "a person designated by a partici-
pant or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or
may become entitled to a benefit thereunder."'129
The typical standing argument says that since nonem-
ployee ex-spouses clearly do not fall within the express defini-
tions of "participant" or "beneficiary," such individuals do
not have standing to sue for benefits under section
502(a)(1)(B). 30 This argument, however, though it has some
surface appeal, would result in creating a right in nonem-
ployee ex-spouses, but denying them any means of enforcing
that right.13 1 Since the courts looked to the legislative history
Thus, the only remaining complaint would be the possibility of conflict with ERISA's
regulatory provisions. But, as has been seen, such a conflict simply does not exist with
regard to community property laws and direct-payment orders effectuating them.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1976).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1976).
130. Under § 502(e)(1) of ERISA, both state and federal district courts have
jurisdiction over § 502(a)(1)(B) suits. Section 502(e)(1) provides:
(e)(1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this sec-
tion, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by . . .a partici-
pant [or] beneficiary. . . .State courts of competent jurisdiction and
district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of
actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section.
131. This conclusion, of course, is inextricably tied to the conclusion in the pre-
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of the Act in order to give full force and effect to Congress'
intent,132 they saw that employees' families constitute a class
of people sought to be protected by Congress.' " Consequently
courts, logically, granted standing to nonemployee ex-
spouses.13
The problem with this result is that courts are uncom-
fortable unless they have a peg on which to hang the result.
Thus, courts have attempted to encompass employee families
within the definitions of "participant" and "beneficiary,"13 5 or
to circumvent the definitions altogether. " '
Regardless of which approach is attempted, the Stone
court's position is the most reasonable and practical. The
court had difficulty with the district court's interpretation of
"participant" as meaning something other than what the plain
words of its statutory definition conveyed."' 7 Nevertheless, the
circuit court glossed over the problem, saying:
ceding section that state law is not preempted by ERISA and that Congress, in writ-
ing ERISA, intended that pension benefit rights survive to an employee's retirement,
as well that those benefits survive so the employee can care for his family and live in
dignity after his retirement. If a contrary conclusion is reached, the nonemployee ex-
spouse would not have such a right.
132. See note 126 supra.
133. See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 926.
134. See id. at 933 n.17.
135. This was the case in Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. at 1259, where the plaintiffs
apparently attempted to bring themselves within the definition of "beneficiaries" by
saying that a state court decree altered the terms of the plan so as to make them
beneficiaries. The district court rejected this argument, as it should have. Not only
does the argument contradict the commonly held notion of what a beneficiary in this
kind of setting means, but it means the state court crossed the line from mere distri-
bution of community property to dabbling in the administration of the trust, an area
preempted by Congress.
It is easier to say that a spouse is some sort of de facto participant under commu-
nity property participation concepts. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 931.
The circuit court believed this was the approach taken by the district court in Stone,
and found the approach troublesome. Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632
F.2d at 743. It should be noted, however, that, while reading between the lines of the
district court decision in Stone may support this conclusion, nowhere did that court
attempt to say that nonemployee ex-spouses are participants. Indeed, in reading that
court's footnote seventeen, it appears the court was careful not to say that. See notes
86 & 88 supra.
136. The California state courts commonly adopt this approach in rejecting the
contention that community property divisions are assignments, and in stating that
nonemployee ex-spouses claim not as creditors but as owners. See In re Marriage of
Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 806. See also Phillipson v. Bd. of
Admin. Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 3 Cal. 3d at 44, 473 P.2d at 772, 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 68.
137. But see note 135 supra.
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The Supreme Court's summary action in Campa sheds
some light on this issue . . . and supports the district
court's conclusion. . . . In dismissing the Campa appeal
for want of a federal question, the United States Supreme
Court necessarily determined that ERISA, including sec-
tion 502(a)(1)(B), does not foreclose suits in state courts
against ERISA-regulated pension plans by spouses seek-
ing to enforce community property interest. At the very
least, therefore, we must say that the word "partici-
pant," as used in section 502(a)(1)(B), does not exclude
an ex-spouse . . . from state court.138
Rather than torturing the statutory definitions to fit these
particular fact situations, this reasonable approach relies on
the legislative history and clear intent of Congress by simply
holding that the statutory definitions; particularly after the
Supreme Court disposition of Campa, do not exclude nonem-
ployee ex-spouses.'39
Thus, section 502(a)(1)(B) does not preclude nonem-
ployee ex-spouses from suing in state or federal court to en-
force community property rights in their former spouse's
pensions.
C. Prohibition (by Section 206(d)(1)) of Assignments and
Alienations
The argument that section 206(d)(1) prohibits division of
pension benefits as community property is inconsistent with
ERISA's purposes and must be rejected.1 40
First, it should be noted that the terms "assignment" and
"alienation" do not unambiguously refer to community prop-
erty divisions. Indeed, the only law defining the status of
spouses in this context is state law, which views them as co-
owners, not as creditors,1 41 which is what the terms apply to
138. Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d at 743 (emphasis added).
139. While this approach arguably splits hairs, and one might say that since the
definitions do not exclude such plaintiffs they arguably include them, thus leading
back to the original problem, such is not the case. Such a rigid and unbending ap-
proach, and blind adherence to words without regard to the purpose for which they
were written, creates unnecessary analytical problems and leads to a result contrary
to that intended by Congress. See generally note 126 supra.
140. There is little that can be added in this analysis to the very thorough dis-
cussion by Judge Renfrew in Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 924-31. Thus, this sec-
tion will be more of a summary.
141. Phillipson v. Bd. of Admin. Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 3 Cal. 3d at
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generally. This, of course, does not dispose of the issue. Since
community property divisions are rather unique, and section
206(d)(1) does not clearly apply to them, it is necessary to
look at the legislative history and the purposes of ERISA to
see if state law interferes with congressional objectives. These
objectives have been previously discussed and will not be re-
peated here. Suffice it to say community property principles,
as applied to ERISA-regulated pensions, do not interfere
with, but further the congressional objective to protect the
employees' and their families' expectations.
Nor are the ERISA concerns of regulating the administra-
tion of pension plans interfered with. An examination of the
ERISA provisions evidences this lack of conflict.""' The only
possible conflict is that pension plans making direct payments
to former spouses will have to write two checks instead of one.
No court thus far has found this burden enough to warrant
precluding direct-pay orders. The extensiveness of the burden
is unclear, though in this day of computer technology it is un-
likely that the burden would be viewed as excessive. More-
over, if the claimants were actual participants rather than for-
mer spouses, it is unlikely the responsibility of writing an
increased number of checks would justify a plan which re-
fused to issue them. Thus, since former spouses have just
claims, their status should not lead to a contrary result.
Furthermore, as the district court noted in Stone, no con-
flict exists with section 206(d)(1) due to direct-pay orders,
even if the burden on plans is more substantial than foreseen
presently, because section 206(d)(1) is not designed to protect
any interests of the plans qua plans. That court noted that,
though "[s]ome antiassignment statutes are designed 'to pre-
vent possible multiple payment of claims, to make unneces-
sary the investigation of alleged assignment, and to enable the
[nonassigning party] to deal only with the [assigning
party],' "1,8 such was not the case with section 206(d)(1).
Rather, "[i]f Congress [had] intended . . . to protect plans
against these kinds of problems, it would not have permitted,
as it did in 206(d)(2), even voluntary and revocable assign-
44, 473 P.2d at 772, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
142. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
143. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 930 (quoting United States v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 373 (1949).
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ments of up to ten percent of any benefit payment."' 44
Since Congress presumptively did not intend to interfere
with state domestic relations laws, 4 5 but, rather, remains neu-
tral with regard to such laws,' 4a section 206(d)(1) does not
preclude a state court from ordering an employee benefit plan
to make direct payments to a nonemployee ex-spouse.
Clearly, if Congress had meant to preclude community
property division of ERISA-regulated pensions, or to preclude
direct-pay orders, it would have done so. Obviously it was
aware of community property laws, and presumably their ef-
fect on pension benefits, as indicated by the Railroad Retire-
ment Act provisions which cut off benefits to spouses upon
absolute divorce, and preclude community property settle-
ments from the exceptions to the antiassignment provisions of
that act. 4" Nonetheless, in spite of this awareness, and the
fact that Congress made provisions for it in the past, it chose
not to do so in ERISA. Thus, Congress presumably intended
to leave unaffected this area of important and unique state
concern.
V. CONCLUSION
In passing ERISA, Congress intended to deal with
problems in the administration of employee benefit plans
which, in the past, served to frustrate the expectations of em-
ployees and their families. The object was to insure that pen-
sion benefits would survive until the employee's retirement so
that he and his family would be provided for. Division of such
benefits pursuant to state community property laws, and di-
rect-pay orders by state courts to regulated plans, do not in-
terfere with the purposes of ERISA and are neither pre-
empted nor otherwise forbidden by that act, nor should they
be.
144. Id. In fact, the exception of § 206(d)(2) creates, if anything, a greater bur-
den than direct pay orders since it requires the plan to make sure no more than ten
percent of the payment is assigned. The court further noted that, in any event, the
availability of interpleader under FED. R. Civ. P. 22 enables the plan to avoid the risk
of double liability and exposure to substantial investigation and litigation expenses
when each spouse claims a right to benefits under a judicial decree of property settle-
ment. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 930.
145. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
146. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 931.
147. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
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